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Why the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 




This paper will analyze the nexus between the regulation of lobbying activities and 
campaign finance, in particular the foggy and perhaps dubious realm of the lobbyist’s role in 
campaign finance.1  Legislative lobbying and campaign finance are policed at the federal level 
by the amended Lobbying Disclosure Act2 (“LDA”) and Federal Election Campaign Act,3 
respectively.  The Supreme Court has recognized that each of these activities implicates 
analogous First Amendment issues, namely, the right to petition the government, the freedom of 
speech, and the freedom of association, but has afforded more deference to campaign finance 
laws while subjecting lobbying regulation to more searching review.4  Apart from federal 
regulation that has generally addressed lobbying and campaign finance separately,5 some states 
have adopted creative and unique laws aimed primarily at the interaction of lobbying and 
campaign finance.6   
Congress recently took its first step toward legislative recognition of the potentially 
corrupting interplay between these constitutionally protected activities when it passed the Honest 
                                                
1 See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 
107 (2008) (“When they occur together, lobbying and campaign contributions can compound the dangers of undue 
influence that each practice presents separately.”).  
2 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1612 
(2008)), amended by Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735. 
3 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 431-41 (2008)).  
4 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (holding that campaign finance restrictions implicate the most 
fundamental First Amendment activities of freedom of speech and association); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 627 (1954) (holding that First Amendment freedoms are involved in the assessment of lobbying regulation).  
5 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119-20.  
6 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.226 (2007) (requiring the reporting and disclosure of all bundled 
contributions, without specifically targeting lobbyists); MINN. STAT. § 10A.27 (2007) (capping the fraction of total 
contributions a candidate can receive from a category of donors comprised of lobbyists, PACs, political funds, and 
large contributors).  
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Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (“HLOGA”),7 which amended the LDA in the 
wake of high-profile lobbying scandals.8  The major issue with respect to these activities that has 
yet to be fully accounted for in federal law is that lobbyists active in campaign finance are in a 
position to exert undue influence on elected officials above and beyond influence exerted 
through each activity separately.  Because lawmakers already turn to lobbyists on a regular basis 
for substantive guidance on complex legislation, those lobbyists who contribute large sums to 
political campaigns can potentially unbalance the democratic process to an extent that justifies 
substantial limitations on activities that are protected by the First Amendment. 
This paper will examine the track record of federal and state lobbying and campaign 
finance laws, as well as related First Amendment litigation, and propose alternative regulatory 
regimes accounting for the concerns raised when lobbying and campaign finance intersect.  The 
scope of this paper will be limited in large measure by focusing on the HLOGA registration and 
disclosure provisions, and addressing campaign finance law tangentially where appropriate.9  
Intended to bring greater transparency to the inner-workings of government, some of these 
provisions actually facilitate the potential of a small number of lobbyists to distort the political 
process.10   
Part I of this paper will provide an overview of the HLOGA and subsequent commentary 
on the amendments.  Part II will discuss some the concerns raised by the combination of 
                                                
7 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119-20 (noting that a “signal feature of the 2007 federal lobbying law is the 
requirement that federal candidate campaign committees, political party committees, and leadership PACs disclose” 
bundled contributions from federally-registered lobbyists in excess of $15,000 in a six-month period). 
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-161(I), at 9 (2007) [hereinafter House Report] (“[The LDA’s] shortcomings were 
highlighted during the 109th Congress by the conviction of a high-profile lobbyist, as well as a number of highly 
publicized incidents” involving gifts to government officials “in exchange for favorable treatment for clients with 
specific interests before the Government.”). 
9 For an overview that informed the discussion of campaign finance laws in this paper, see Audra L. Wassom, 
Campaign Finance Legislation: McCain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan – The Political Equality Rationale and Beyond, 
55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1781 (2002).  




lobbying and campaign finance activity.  In Part III, this paper will look at some innovative 
approaches to the problem adopted by state legislatures and suggest changes to the federal 
regime that would guard against improper influence on the democratic process without undue 
infringement on First Amendment rights.  Part IV concludes that more effective requirements are 
needed to promote transparency and public faith in the legislative process. 
 
Part I: The Federal Approach 
Registration Requirements 
The federal government’s primary means of regulating lobbyist conduct is to require that 
lobbyists disclose their contact information, their clients’ information, and, to the maximum 
extent practicable, the specific bill numbers and executive branch actions on which they 
lobbied.11  The HLOGA requires individuals and their employers to register with the House 
Clerk and Senate Secretary within forty-five days of making his or her first “lobbying contact,” 
unless the individual or firm earns less than $2,500 from, or spends less than $10,000 on, 
“lobbying activities”12 in a given four-month period.13  
A “lobbying contact” means any oral or written communication to a covered executive or 
legislative branch official,14 made on behalf of a client with regard to the “formulation, 
modification, or adoption” of federal legislation, regulation, or the administration of a federal 
program or policy, including the negotiation and awarding of federal contracts.15  Public 
                                                
11 Briffault, supra note 1, at 112.  
12 “‘[L]obbying activities’ means lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation 
and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in 
contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.”  2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(7).  
13 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a). 
14 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(3)-(4) defines “Covered executive or legislative branch official,” which covers the President 
and Vice-President, Members of Congress, their staffs, policy advisors, as well as any member of the uniformed 
services at or above a certain pay grade.   
15 2 U.S.C.A. § 1602(8)(A).  
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speeches and articles, requests for meetings or the status of an action, testimony to government 
bodies included in the public record, information provided in response to a request by a covered 
official for specific information, statements submitted during public comment periods, and 
statements by tax-exempt religious organizations are not “lobbying contacts.”16 
The registration filing must state contact information for the lobbyist, the client, and any 
entity other than the client that contributes more than $5,000 per quarter to fund lobbying 
activities or actively participates in planning or managing lobbying activities.17  If other 
contributing organizations are listed on the client’s publicly accessible Web site as contributors, 
their disclosure is not required.18  Disclosure of any information about individuals who are 
members of, or contribute to, a client or an organization that contributes to a client is explicitly 
exempted.  Additionally, the filing must state the general issue areas and, to the extent 
practicable, the specific issues on which the registrant expects to engage in lobbying.19  Finally, 
the filing must indicate whether any employees of the registrant worked as a covered executive 
or legislative branch official in the twenty-year period leading up to that filing.20 
 
Quarterly Reports 
Registration is only the first step of the disclosure process.  Each registrant must file a 
quarterly lobbying activity report with the House Clerk and Senate Secretary.21  Most notably, 
quarterly reports must (1) include a list of the specific issues on which the registrant engaged in 
lobbying activities and, “to the maximum extent practicable,” a list of bill numbers and 
                                                
16 § 1602(8)(B).  
17 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b).  
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 § 1603(b)(6).  
21 2 U.S.C.A. § 1604. 
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references to executive branch actions; (2) indicate which chamber of Congress or agency was 
contacted; (3) include a good faith estimate of lobbying-related earnings and expenditures; and 
(4) identify any State or local governments on whose behalf the registrant lobbied.22  
 
Fundraising Disclosure 
One area in which lobbying and campaign finance regulations overlap under the HLOGA 
is in their treatment of “bundled” contributions.  “Bundling” occurs when an entity, either an 
individual or an organization, on its own initiative, receives numerous campaign contributions 
and then delivers the collective sum, which often far exceeds campaign contribution limits on 
individuals, to a candidate on the donors’ behalf.23  The intended result is that the delivering 
lobbyist will earn “credit” from the candidate for the large donation.24  Those making “bundled” 
contributions must file a report with the Federal Election Commission within thirty days of the 
transfer of money to the candidate.25  The recipient candidate must identify the bundler with each 
contribution received on his or her campaign reports.26  Under the HLOGA amendments, 
leadership PACs and party committees must report additional information about bundled 
contributions over $15,000 provided by a registered federal lobbyist during a reporting period if 
that lobbyist delivers two or more bundled contributions.27 
 
                                                
22 § 1604(b). 
23 See Chip Nielsen & Jason D. Kaune, Corporate Political Activities 2008: Complying with Campaign Finance, 
Lobbying & Ethics Laws, 1689 PLI/Corp 13, 38, Sept. 11-12, 2008. 
24 See HLOGA, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204(8).  
25 See Nielsen & Kaune, supra note 23, at 38.  
26 Id. 




Public disclosure of lobbying information can work as “a powerful disinfectant” against 
rule breaking and shortcutting the formal policy-making process.28  Disclosing the identities of 
lobbyists benefits several distinct groups, the first of which is lawmakers and government 
officials dealing with an increasingly complex and nuanced array of issues.29  Lobbyists provide 
focused expertise and analysis that help public officials make informed decisions and often 
bridge the gaps in divided and gridlocked government.30  Moreover, information available from 
disclosure reports can shed light on the motivation, extent, and nature of lobbying activities to 
enterprising lawmakers and their staffs.31   
Of primary importance to the Supreme Court in considering a First Amendment 
challenge to the LDA’s predecessor was that disclosure benefits lawmakers themselves.32  In 
United States v. Harriss, the Court explained that “[p]resent-day legislative complexities are 
such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to 
which they are regularly subjected,” and that disclosure allows lawmakers “to know who is being 
hired, who is putting up the money, and how much” with regard to lobbyists’ overtures.33   
Advocacy by lobbyists and information about the extent and nature of their activities 
helps lawmakers engage in a fact-finding process, much like a judge or jury would assess the 
                                                
28 See Nicolas W. Allard, Lobbying Is An Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to be 
Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (2008).  Mr. Allard is a partner co-chairing the Public Policy and 
Administrative Law Department at Patton Boggs LLP, a firm recognized by the Washington Post as the most 
powerful lobbying firm in Washington, DC.  See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lobbying Is Lucrative. Sometimes Very, Very 
Lucrative, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, at A11.  
29 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 116-117.  
30 See Allard, supra note 28, at 42.  
31 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 119 (“[D]isclosure is particularly valuable in the lobbying context because it gives 
legislators a greater understanding of the pressures to which they are subject.”).  This argument is of questionable 
validity.  If lawmakers and their staffs are so pinched for time that they rely on lobbyists for substantive information, 
it is highly unlikely that they have the time or motivation to sift through the mountain of data contained in disclosure 
reports to perform some sort of background check on the lobbyists walking them through the legislative process.  
32 Harriss, supra note 4, at 625. 
33 Id.   
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credibility of a witness based not only on the witness’ direct examination, but also on his 
responses under cross examination, and perhaps his criminal or financial record, or even his 
demeanor on the stand.  As Senator Hubert Humphrey explained, “the right to be heard does not 
automatically include the right to be taken seriously.”34  The most effective, and often the best 
compensated lobbyists work hard to establish and maintain their credibility with lawmakers, just 
as a trial lawyer would with a judge.35 
The second distinct facet of society benefited by disclosure is the universe of interest 
groups and organizations driving the boom in the practice of lobbying.36  Some commentators 
consider information conferred through disclosure laws to be the most valuable to competing 
interest groups themselves, as opposed to lawmakers or the public at large.37  They argue that 
groups will “step up their own lobbying efforts to match those of their competitors,”38 a practice 
that would, without disclosure laws, constitute little more than guesswork.  When complied with 
and enforced, lobbying disclosure laws “can promote the goal of fair competition among interest 
groups in the ‘familiar Madisonian fashion of allowing factions to check factions in the service 
of the public good.’”39  
                                                
34 Allard, supra note 28, at 32 (quoting SILENCING THE OPPOSITION: GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES OF SUPPRESSION OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 194-95 (Craig R. Smith ed., 1996)).  
35 See W. Laird Stabler, III, From Private Practice to Private Practice (The Governmental Roundtrip), 17 
DELAWARE LAW. 15, 17, Fall, 1999 (“Thus, while being an advocate, a lobbyist must always remember that the 
statements he or she makes concerning legislative initiatives must be accurate or the lobbyist will lose credibility. A 
lack of credibility is certain to destroy a good working relationship with the members of the General Assembly, as it 
would with a Judge.”); Allard, supra note 28, at 46 (“In reality, successful advocacy ultimately depends on the 
lobbyist's ability to explain how a given position advances the public interest, to respond to counter arguments 
advanced by persuasive and skillful advocates, and to do so credibly, consistently, and concisely.”). 
36 Briffault, supra note 1, at 117.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. (quoting Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group Based Approach to Lobbying 
Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 542 (2007).  
39 Id.  Another commentator asserts that, “[i]f, in drafting the Constitution, James Madison had consciously sought 
to create a governmental system that would encourage – indeed dictate – that lobbying would become central to 
policymaking, he could scarcely have done a better job.”  Burdett A. Loomis, From the Framing to the Fifties: 
Lobbying in Constitutional and Historical Contexts, EXTENSIONS, Fall 2006, at 1 (2006).  
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Another commentator argues that the HLOGA had one major unintended consequence. 
Contrary to free market theory, the LDA’s new rules “have not dampened the demand and need 
for lobbyists.  Instead, greater regulation has actually coincided with a sharp increase in 
professional lobbying.”40  The commentator goes on to attribute to the new lobbying rules, 
enhanced enforcement, and stricter penalties the transformation of lobbying from “what was 
once a cottage industry of government ethics and lobbying training” into “a booming practice 
area for Washington law firms.”41  
Finally, the general public benefits from lobbying disclosure.  For the private citizen, to 
know who really has the ear of one’s representative is relevant and valuable information, and the 
First Amendment principle of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate is advanced by 
requiring disclosure of these activities.42  This information can enhance public understanding of 
how government works, educate as to what factors influence government decisions, and provide 
an awareness of which groups are engaged in influencing particular policies and which policies 
are being pushed.43   
 
HLOGA’s Weaknesses44 
Although some disclosure is better than none, pointed criticism can be leveled on the 
LDA for its failure to require more precise information regarding bills or agency actions that are 
                                                
40 Allard, supra note 28, at 24.  Ironically enough, Mr. Allard points out that one critical function performed by 
lobbyists is to clue in lawmakers to the unintended consequences of proposed legislation.  He observes that “[i]t is 
sometimes the case that without input from the erstwhile ‘beneficiary’ of a new law or regulation, the provision 
would produce unwelcome results.” Id. at 43.  However, it is possible that lobbying activities have not spiked in 
recent years.  Rather, it could be that legislative advocates did not consider themselves lobbyists until the HLOGA 
informed them as such.  
41 Id. at 24. 
42 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 118-19.  
43 Id.  
44 It is worth noting that weaknesses should probably be anticipated in a bill intended to regulate those who crafted 
it.   
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the focus of lobbying efforts, the specific lawmakers or agency officials contacted, and the 
financial supporters of these advocacy campaigns beyond the actual client.45  Moreover, 
enforcement of the regulations has yet to gather steam.  The LDA requires the Secretary of the 
Senate and the Clerk of the House to refer cases of noncompliance with the reporting and 
disclosure requirements to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for enforcement.46  
However, the number of infractions actually investigated by the Secretary or the Clerk is 
dramatically outpaced by the extent of noncompliance.47  It is unclear whether enforcement 
actions are being effectively pursued by the Justice Department,48 because not until the LDA’s 
2007 amendments was there a requirement in place for the Attorney General to report regularly 
on the status of enforcement proceedings.49  
One especially poorly drafted provision is the requirement that quarterly reports disclose 
merely what chamber of Congress or executive agency was the subject of lobbying activities, 
providing little or no valuable insight to lawmakers, interest groups, or the general public.50 
Moreover, while not providing useful data, the LDA’s duplicative registration filings and 
quarterly reports impose a substantial administrative and financial burden on lobbyists and their 
employers.  Combine a requirement for producing arguably useless data with a requirement to 
produce it four times a year, and the result is a mountain of paper that would frighten even a 
seasoned investigative reporter with a powerful computer.   
Although interest groups with resources to analyze this data are able to glean useful 
insight into the activities of their competitors, the goal of the HLOGA was not to enhance and 
                                                
45 Id. at 115.  
46 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a).  
47 See House Report, supra note 8, at 10.  
48 Id.  
49 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1605(b).  
50 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1604(b). 
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facilitate more lobbying efforts, but “to provide greater transparency in the legislative process,”51 
and instill confidence in the political process.  One commentator asserts that the voter 
information benefit of disclosure is almost surely overstated because the “effectiveness of 
disclosure relies, in significant part, on the media’s interest in examining the available 
information and presenting it to the public in useful form before the election.”52  Absent such a 
labor-intensive endeavor by the media, private citizens stand to gain little from the registration 
and disclosure requirements enacted in the HLOGA. 
For disclosure laws to be effective in promoting transparency, they must provide facts 
that people want to see in times, places, and ways that enable them to act on that information.53  
Disclosure is least likely to influence the behavior of those required to disclose or those 
employing information disclosed when users face a limited set of choices and so could not act on 
new information.54  Disclosure laws – particularly highly-publicized laws like HLOGA – may 
have the perverse effect of hiding from elected officials the voters’ views on their campaign 
finance sources.55 
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, in situations where the identifiable lobbying 
client is essentially a front for undisclosed organizations – a “stealth coalition” – requiring the 
disclosure of the client without more information as to its financial backers does little more than 
supply a starting point for ambitious watchdog groups.  Section 207 of the HLOGA sought to 
“close a loophole that has allowed so-called ‘stealth coalitions,’ often with innocuous-sounding 
                                                
51 See Pub. L. No. 110-81 (2007).  
52 Briffault, supra note 1, at 115-16.  
53 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 116 (citing ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: 





names, to operate without identifying the interests engaged in lobbying activities.”56  However, 
unless a coalition member contributes more than $5,000 to the registered lobbyists or client, or 
“actively participates in the planning, supervision, or control” of the coalition’s lobbying 
activities, disclosure of such members is not required.57   
In a recently decided case, the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) 
challenged HLOGA section 207 as unconstitutional both facially and as-applied to the NAM.58  
The NAM argues on its Web site that “[t]he provision was nominally targeted at ‘stealth 
coalitions,’ whatever they are, but missed that mark and hit legitimate, long-standing and well-
known organizations like the NAM that have corporate members.”59  The NAM claimed that if it 
were “forced to disclose certain of its member organizations, those members will suffer 
retaliation in the form of boycotts and other action against them.”60  In rejecting this argument, 
the court noted that despite the fact that the NAM’s publicly available Web site already discloses 
more than 250 of its more than 11,000 member organizations, there was no evidence of past 
incidents suggesting that affiliation with the group leads to the substantial risk of threats, 
harassment, or reprisals from government officials or private parties.61  Furthermore, the section 
exempts from disclosure “any information about individuals who are members of, or donors to, 
an entity treated as a client.”62  This exception opens the door for like-minded but unaffiliated 
                                                
56 See Nat’l Assoc. Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying association’s motion for 
declaratory and injunctive relief as to 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b)) (quoting 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 
2007) (statement of Sens. Feinstein, Lieberman, and Reid)).  
57 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b).  
58 See NAM v. Taylor, supra note 56. 
59 For the NAM’s interpretation of the new regulations, see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.,  
National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 2008) -- Issue 




60 NAM, supra note 56, at 75. 
61 Id. 
62 § 1603(b)(3)(B).   
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entities to create virtually unaccountable shell organizations with which they shield their 
lobbying and campaign finance activities from public scrutiny.   
In its argument challenging the constitutionality of HLOGA section 207, the NAM 
ironically highlights the weaknesses of the new disclosure requirements.  The association argues 
that section 207   
is both over-inclusive, in that it requires reporting by organizations that are by 
their nature not “stealth coalitions,” and under-inclusive, in that it exempts 
coalitions that do not hire their own lobbyists or that are funded by individual 
rather than corporate contributions.  It is also extremely vague, and requires the 
expenditure of considerable resources to try to determine what it means and how 
to monitor the myriad member company activities that might be considered 
“active participation” in lobbying activities.  Lobbying organizations may comply 
simply by listing all their members, including ones that do not meet the $5,000 
and active-participation tests, resulting in information to the public that is not 
responsive to the purported need to scrutinize “stealth coalitions.”63 
 
As the NAM points out, HLOGA has two loopholes through which coalitions seeking to 
influence public policy might slip.64  The more important one is the exception to the required 
disclosure of individual members or donors.  This provision essentially codifies Supreme Court 
holdings and dicta from civil rights-era cases that addressed as-applied First Amendment 
challenges to disclosure laws.65  Although grounded on Supreme Court jurisprudence, this 
exemption arguably extends a protection intended to preserve the viability of oppressed minority 
political parties to organizations that are not historically “the object of harassment by 
                                                
63 See NAM Interpretation, supra note 59.  
64 § 1603(b)(3)(B).  
65 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88, 103 (1982) (holding Ohio 
disclosure requirements unconstitutional as applied to “a minor political party which historically has been the object 
of harassment by government officials and private parties”); Buckley, 424 U.S., at 74 (exempting minor parties from 
disclosure requirements if they can show “a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's 
contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private 
parties”);  NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that a court order compelling the production of the 
names and addresses of the Association’s Alabama membership violated due process protections because 
compliance would have imposed a substantial restraint on members’ right to freedom of association).  
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government officials and private parties.”66  Absent a showing of “a reasonable probability that 
the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, 
or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties,”67 organizations do not need 
Congress to erect statutory barriers to transparent and honest governance in the name of privacy 
that the First Amendment already protects.  Section 1603(b)(3)(B) works to obfuscate what is 
arguably an area where more disclosure – not less – would serve the public interest.  Congress 
should avoid codifying case law addressing as-applied challenges to disclosure laws because 
such rulings are fact-specific,68 and as black letter law are vulnerable to abuse in circumstances 
bearing no resemblance with the cases on which the legislation is based.  In the NAM’s case, the 
real question is why is the association so reluctant to disclose its member organizations?  
Building on this question, why should not all such coalitions be required to disclose their 
membership?   
The argument that revealing the identities of lobbyists, their clients, and supporting 
organizations and individuals potentially chills expression of dissident or unpopular views 
should not apply when the actions of elected representatives are so heavily influenced – 
                                                
66 Socialist Workers, supra note 65.  
67 Buckley, supra note 4, at 74.  
68 See, e.g., NAACP, supra note 65, where the Alabama Attorney General sued to enjoin the NAACP from 
conducting further business in, and to oust the NAACP from, the State of Alabama.  Contrary to Alabama law 
requiring any foreign corporation to file its charter with the Secretary of State, the NAACP had never complied with 
the qualification statute because it considered itself exempt.   
The suit alleged, inter alia, that the NAACP had recruited members and solicited contributions within the 
State, had given financial support and furnished legal assistance to black students seeking admission to the state 
university, and had supported a black boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers 
without regard to race.  By continuing to operate in Alabama, the NAACP was “causing irreparable injury to the 
property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and 
civil actions at law afford no adequate relief.”  The court issued an ex parte order restraining the NAACP from 
operating within the state and forbidding it from taking any steps to qualifying itself to do business in Alabama.  357 
U.S. 449, 452-53.   
Under circumstances such as these, it is regrettable that court intervention was required to establish that 
state-compelled disclosure of membership or donor identities would violate the First Amendment freedom of 
association.  However, by codifying this exception to disclosure requirements, Congress overshot the mark in an 
attempt to preclude such an unconscionable case from arising in the future. 
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improperly or not – by advocates ethically and legally bound to zealously represent the interests 
of their clients.69  Anonymity can protect “the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”70  But when lawmakers constantly rely on lobbyists to 
inform substantive decisions, as they often do,71 the rationale for protecting anonymity to 
promote an open and uninhibited exchange of ideas is turned on its head.  Lifting the curtain on 
lobbyists, whom they lobby, and for what purpose, serves to protect and foster – not undermine – 
the underlying First Amendment principle that “valuable public debate – as well as other civic 
behavior – must be informed.”72  
Although there are legitimate weaknesses in the LDA, at least one commentator argues 
that intense competition “to be right” is “perhaps the most effective self-correcting mechanism in 
the policy process.”73  Given that the number of registered lobbyists in Washington has doubled 
in the last decade, each one must work twice as hard at zealously advocating his client’s 
positions.74  Lawmakers and their staffs, “if they are any good, as most are,” rely on a variety of 
sources to inform their decision-making processes.75  As California Democrat “Big Daddy” Jesse 
Unruh saw it, “if you can’t eat their food, drink their booze, …take their money and then vote 
against them, you’ve got no business being up here [in the state legislature].”76   
                                                
69 See Stabler, supra note 35, at 17.  
70 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  Although New York Times did not address lobbying 
disclosure requirements, it is a leading First Amendment case that provides an excellent analysis of the freedom of 
speech in the context of public discourse.  
71 See generally Stabler, supra note 35 (providing a first-hand account of the author’s lobbying practice). 
72 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
73 See Allard, supra note 28, at 31. 
74 Id. at 49.  
75 Id. According to Allard, however, the variety of sources is often comprised entirely of lobbyists. Id. at 43 (“The 
truth of the matter is that legislation in Washington is extraordinarily complex…the only way [lawmakers and their 
staffs] can really get to the bottom of a lot of complex issues is to rely on lobbyists.”) (quoting Kenneth Gross, a 
leading expert on lobbying and election law). 
76 Allard, supra note 28, at n.20 (quoting BILL BOYARSKY, BIG DADDY: JESSE UNRUH AND THE ART OF POWER 
POLITICS (2008)).  Unruh, whose career as a leading Democrat spanned four decades, served as California’s 
Assembly Speaker and State Treasurer.  Allard mentions two other statements, the likes of which will never see a 
serious public forum again.  The first is longtime House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s policy on accepting gifts: “You just 
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With this positive development, however, comes an arguably negative corollary: 
increased competition between lobbyists for legislative staff and members’ time, which raises the 
question of just how directly campaign contributions are connected to “access.”77  Although the 
commentator initially downplays the relationship between campaign contributions and access to 
lawmakers and their staffs, he acknowledges that “a surprising number of lobbyists admit flat-out 
that they hate the system as it is, and would even endorse a complete campaign finance overhaul, 
which perhaps might even include a prohibition of political contributions by professional 
lobbyists.”78  This distaste for the current system is based in part on the characterization of 
campaign donations as “the gift that keeps on taking,” in that once a lobbyist’s contribution is 
disclosed, fundraisers and candidates often identify the lobbyist as a potential source of funds.79 
 
Part II: The Nexus Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance 
Public Concern Over Improper Influence 
The tension between core democratic principles of political equality – “one person, one 
vote” – and the rights to petition the government and make campaign contributions give rise to 
the central concern that lobbyists who are heavily engaged in campaign finance distort the 
democratic process.80  Because large campaign contributions, particularly “bundled” 
contributions, can facilitate “access” to lawmakers, there is a legitimate worry that those with the 
deepest pockets exert the most influence on the legislative process, to the detriment of the public 
                                                                                                                                                       
don’t take it unless you can eat it, drink it, or smoke it in twenty-four hours.”  The second is a campaign 
advertisement for a Pennsylvania candidate: “Drink Their Beer, Carry Their Signs, and Take Their Money, But Vote 
for a ‘Watchdog’ by voting for Stephen Sinchak.” 
77 Id. at 50.  
78 Allard, supra note 28, at 52.  
79 Id. at 51-52.  
80 Id. at 108-12.  
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at large.81  Campaign money works with lobbying to promote the election of public officials that 
are more amenable or sympathetic to the donors’ goals, particularly because of the ability of 
large contributions to “open doors” for those who can make them, an ability that lobbyists 
themselves acknowledge.82  
Anyone who followed the 2008 Democratic nomination contest saw several of the 
leading candidates butt heads over the propriety of accepting campaign contributions from 
lobbyists.83  Barack Obama moved to seize the moral high ground on the issue of special interest 
influence when he said that lobbyists routinely manipulate bills and that large corporations 
essentially run the legislative and policymaking show, and he once claimed that he would not 
work with or employ federal lobbyists in his administration.84  These strong public 
pronouncements in the heat of a campaign were politically shrewd, especially considering that 
exit polls from the 2006 election cycle revealed that 80% of Americans believe that lobbyists 
exercise undue influence on public policy,85 and 81% of respondents to a January 2006 Pew 
Research Center poll believe it is common for lobbyists to bribe members of Congress.86  
Although Obama followed through on his promise to refuse donations from federally-registered 
lobbyists, both he and Hilary Clinton received vast sums of money from attorneys representing 
large corporations, and who frequently worked for firms employing registered lobbyists.87  
                                                
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 111-12.  
83 See Ruth Marcus, Democrats’ Purity Primary, WASH. POST., Aug. 22, 2007, at A17 (reporting that John Edwards 
and Barack Obama refuse to accept campaign donations from lobbyists while Hilary Clinton defends her acceptance 
of such contributions on the ground that lobbyists’ clients, not lobbyists themselves, are the real problem).   
84 See James Oliphant, Take No Money from Lobbyists? They Say It’s Not That Simple, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2008, at 
A19. 
85 Allard, supra note 28, at 25.  
86 Id. at 51.  
87 Marcus, supra note 83.  
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Clinton defended her acceptance of lobbyist money by arguing that the real issue was 
special interests, not the lobbyists representing them.88  This argument is bolstered by the fact 
that, although Obama never accepted contributions from de jure lobbyists, he took nearly 
$65,000 from lawyers at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld.89  Akin Gump lawyers represent 
large oil companies such as Lukoil, while lobbyists employed by the firm represent some of the 
biggest and baddest corporations around: oil giants Exxon and BP, agribusiness behemoth 
Archer Daniels Midland, and aerospace and defense titan Boeing.90  While the Clinton camp 
criticized Obama’s lobbyist-related campaign promises as a naïve overstatement, and while it is 
possible to find hypocrisy in his campaign finance disclosures, he arguably deserves credit for 
“at least taking a stand” on the issue.91   
In a recent television interview, Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) expressed a widely held and 
judicially recognized92 belief that lobbyists and large donors wield misrepresentative and 
improper influence on government decision makers, here in the context of the financial bailout 
package.   
Those lobbyists have a lot of money behind them, and then the ordinary citizen[s], 
on whose back this bailout price tag has been placed, have nobody lobbying for 
                                                
88 Id.  Accord Allard, supra note 28, at 46-47 (“[A]s a lobbyist, who you represent and what you have to say on their 
behalf are more important than who you are.”). 
89 Oliphant, supra note 84.  
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 See, e.g., Reid Wilson, Blackwell Enters GOP Chairman Race, THE HILL, Dec. 5, 2008, available at 
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/blackwell-enters-gop-chairman-race-2008-12-05.html.  Describing similarities 
between RNC leadership candidates Ken Blackwell (former Ohio Secretary of State) and Michael Steele (former 
Maryland Lt. Governor), the author included in a list of positive political attributes that, “[t]hey are also big draws 
on the fundraising circuit, which gives them valuable favors to call in from those they've helped in the past.”  This is 
exactly what the Supreme Court was referring to when, on its way to upholding campaign finance limitations, it 
recognized that, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and 
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).  More recently, the Court has recognized that improper influence is not limited to outright 
bribery, but extends “to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”  
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).  
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them but their members of congress, and we need to get that [bailout] money out 
now, down into the communities that are being affected.93 
 
Although the federal laws governing campaign finance and lobbying generally treat those 
activities as separate and distinct, the public does not appear to recognize this formalistic legal 
distinction, and it certainly does not reflect the reality of lobbying and campaign finance.  Given 
that campaign finance and lobbying regulations are justified on the ground that they buttress 
public confidence in the democratic process,94 there is a strong case for addressing these 
interconnected issues in a more comprehensive and pragmatic manner.   
 
The Real Problem with Lobbying and Campaign Finance 
Most lobbyists do not make campaign contributions,95 but the most active lobbyists are 
frequent and generous donors.96  A recent Public Citizen survey found that from 1998 through 
2005, about one-quarter of federally-registered lobbyists contributed an amount sufficient to 
trigger the reporting requirement, $200 or more,97 to a single congressional candidate or political 
action committee.98  Although that figure may not surprise an interested voter, the study also 
revealed that 6% of all federally registered lobbyists accounted for 83% of all lobbyists’ 
                                                
93 Lou Dobbs Tonight: Bailout Frenzy (CNN television broadcast Nov. 12, 2008) (reporting by Ines Ferre).  Rep. 
Kaptur voted against the bailout bill twice.  Many observers attribute the provision of bailout funds to financial 
institutions – as opposed to distressed mortgage holders supposedly at the heart of the economic crisis – to the 
efforts of lobbyists.  One Washington Post headline read, “A Lobbying Frenzy for Federal Funds.”   
94 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995) (distinguishing the Government’s 
compelling interests in regulation of independent campaign expenditures in Buckley and lobbyist disclosure 
requirements in Harriss from Ohio’s interest in preventing fraud and libel from an “open-ended” ban on distribution 
of anonymous issue-advocacy pamphlets).  
95 See ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) 200 
(Cambridge University Press 2006).  
96 Briffault, supra note 1, at 111.  
97 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1604(d)(1)(D).  
98 PUB. CITIZEN, The Bankrollers: Lobbyists’ Payments to the Lawmakers They Court, 1998-2006, at 7 (2006) 
[hereinafter Bankrollers], available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/BankrollersFinal.pdf.  
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campaign contributions.99  Furthermore, while there are interest groups with lobbyists that 
advocate on behalf of nearly every facet of society,100 not all of those groups have the financial 
resources to compete day in and day out in the campaign finance arms race.  It is clear that 
money can matter to a degree that is in tension with the formal political equality of citizens.101 
The House Judiciary Committee’s report on HLOGA (“House Report”) cites a study by 
the Center for Public Integrity, published in April 2006, that found that since 1998, lobbyists had 
“spent nearly $13 billion to influence Members of Congress and other Federal officials on 
legislation and regulation….  This is roughly twice as much as the already vast amount that was 
spent on Federal political campaigns in the same time period.”102 
Although the figures above are remarkable, the underlying trend is alarming to some,103 
and reassuring to others.104  The amount of money being spent to influence both elections and 
legislation is exploding.  Campaign contributions from lobbyists and their firms’ PACs nearly 
doubled from $17.8 million in the 2000 election cycle to $33.9 million in the 2004 cycle.105  
There are at least two explanations for the leap, although the second does not render the trend 
any less troubling.  First, the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act doubled individual 
                                                
99 Id. at 14.  The study also reported that Jack Abramoff personally donated $180,000 to congressional candidates 
between 1998 and 2005, amounting to 7% of the $2.6 million that he funneled to congressional campaigns during 
that time.  Id. at 24-26.  
100 See Allard, supra note 28, at 33 (noting that debates over the State Children’s Health Insurance Program “pitted 
‘lobbyists’ representing children, nurses, doctors, senior citizens, nursing homes, specialty hospitals, health 
businesses, insurance companies, tobacco companies, convenience stores, gas stations, states, foreign sovereigns, 
and the Administration against each other, with all vying for different legislative outcomes.”)  
101 Briffault, supra note 1, at 108.  
102 House Report, supra note 8, at 10.  
103 See Bankrollers, supra note 98, at 11 (calling for significant limitations on the ability of lobbyists to funnel 
contributions to politicians). 
104 Allard, supra note 28, at 25 (2008) (“Today, lobbying is more necessary, widespread, and complicated than ever 
before.  It is also more open, more professional, subject to more rules, and practiced with a greater degree of legal 
compliance.”).  
105 Bankrollers, supra note 98, at 7.   
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contribution limits between 2000 and 2004.106  Second, these figures could be distorted as 
unregistered lobbyists that contributed in the 2000 election cycle formally register before the 
2004 cycle, which would artificially inflate the upward trend in lobbyists’ campaign donations.  
Between 2000 and 2004, the number of lobbyists in Washington more than doubled, from around 
16,000 to almost 35,000.107  The second explanation is supported by the House Report, which 
notes that nearly 14,000 documents that should have been filed are missing, almost 300 
individuals, companies, or other entities have lobbied without being registered, and more than 
2,000 initial registrations were filed after the legal deadline.108   
Although Mr. Allard cites the ability of an increasingly competitive marketplace for 
lobbying services to cleanse itself of unscrupulous practitioners, he implicitly acknowledges that 
with twice as many lobbyists in Washington, “access” on Capitol Hill could legitimately be 
characterized as twice as expensive.109  “According to the prevailing popular view, access is 
almost always a function of campaign contributions.  Experience and data, however, suggest 
otherwise.”110  To support this argument, the author cites results of a Policy Council survey 
finding that 13% of Hill staffers rated campaign contributions as a determining factor, while just 
1% found it to be the most important factor.111  The survey found that the most important 
determining factor for access, cited by 56% of respondents, was the “importance of the 
organization [represented] to the member’s state or district,” while the second most important 
factor was the lobbyist’s reputation for providing credible, reliable information.112  What makes 
any given organization important to a member is a subjective determination that is likely to vary 
                                                
106 See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  Conversely, the HLOGA halved the amounts triggering the 
LDA’s registration requirements for lobbyists.  See 2 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a)(3)(A).  
107 Allard, supra  note 28, at 49.  
108 House Report, supra note 8, at 10.  
109 See Allard, supra note 28, at 50. 





according to a number of different considerations.  The one constant, however, is that “it is 
unrealistic to dismiss the role of campaign contributions in the lobbying process,” and research 
has confirmed the connection between PAC contributions and lobbying access.113 Although 
money and resulting access do not “buy votes,”114 the connection between campaign 
contributions and influence is impossible to deny. 
 
Part III: Suggestions for Improvement 
 Mandatory, universal government finance of election campaigns with a prohibition on 
outside funding for direct candidate advocacy would go a long way toward eliminating the 
problems raised when lobbyists heavily engage themselves in campaign finance.  Although such 
an approach would restrict the First Amendment right to “political speech” expressed through 
campaign donations, applying this restriction without exception would not disadvantage an 
identifiable portion of society, and would serve a compelling interest in restoring public 
confidence in the democratic process.  Moreover, public financing of elections would remove 
perverse incentives for lobbyists, who are duty bound to zealously advocate their clients’ 
positions, and who are all too aware that campaign donations allow them to better discharge this 
duty.  Furthermore, removing money from the equation would place emphasis where it should be 
– on the merits of lobbyists’ arguments rather than on their “loyalty” to a particular candidate or 
campaign.   
 One commentator noted how Obama’s rejection of lobbyists’ campaign donations 
compelled an approach he called “messaging over money.”115  “Since no lobbyist can give 
                                                
113 Id. (citing John R. Wright, PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation, 51 J. POL. 713 (1989)).  
114 Id. at 51.  




money to Obama’s presidential campaign or to the Democratic National Committee,” he wrote, 
“our ideas and suggestions will have to be accepted or rejected on their merits and not because of 
any perceived special standing based on a campaign contribution.”116  If lobbying is to remain an 
integral part of the policymaking process – which it undoubtedly should if lawmakers are to 
make informed decisions – lobbying efforts should stand or fall on their substance, not on 
whether the lobbyist helped a particular candidate get elected through fundraising efforts. 
 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective and egalitarian public finance of elections is 
determining eligibility for taxpayer dollars.  Candidates not affiliated with the Republican or 
Democratic parties would probably be the losers in a public finance regime, and this would 
arguably hurt the democratic process by effectively silencing viewpoints outside the mainstream 
political ideologies.  This concern is mitigated by the fact that independent candidates have 
rarely enjoyed political success on a national scale.  In the event that the established political 
parties diverge from the popular will, however, publicly-financed elections could create a 
dangerous scenario where neither publicly-financed candidate represents the majority of the 
public.  These issues could probably be resolved with the adoption of flexible regulations that 
acknowledge the potential for major party divergence from political undercurrents for 
determining who receives public financing. 
 In the absence of a wholesale departure from the current system, the federal government 
should look to the states for better ways of regulating the intersection of lobbying and campaign 
finance.  Federalism principles underlying the Constitution allow the states to test innovative and 
novel legislative solutions to social and economic challenges, essentially rendering the states 
                                                
116 Id.  (“Lobbyists would have no special status, and we will have to rely on the value of our ideas and our advocacy 
skills, just like all the others who are participating in the political and policymaking process.  Thus, by cutting the 
link between campaign contributions and lobbyists, Obama has addressed the cause of the public’s angst — the 
sense that campaign contributions equate to influence — and thus created the basis for lobbyists to participate in the 
political and policymaking process.”).  
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laboratories in which state legislatures may conduct these experiments.117  To this end, a number 
of states have enacted laws imposing a variety of campaign finance restrictions specifically 
targeting lobbyists, bundled contributions, or combinations of the two.118  
Some of these restrictions have a temporal element.  Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and 
Wisconsin prohibit lobbyists from making, and legislators from accepting, campaign 
contributions while the legislature is in session.119  Others take disclosure requirements a step 
further than HLOGA.  Washington and Rhode Island require lobbyists to disclose campaign 
contributions in their regular lobbying reports,120 and Washington goes further by requiring 
disclosure of bundled contributions as well.121  The Maryland legislature considers lobbyists’ 
bundled contributions to be so worrisome as to warrant their outright ban,122 and North Carolina 
lawmakers prohibit any campaign contributions to elected officials by lobbyists.123  Alaska 
prohibits a lobbyist from making campaign contributions to any candidate for state legislature 
other than candidates running to represent the district where the lobbyist is eligible to vote.124  
Michigan’s legislation sweeps more broadly to require the reporting and disclosure of bundled 
contributions generally, without specifically targeting lobbyists.125  Finally, Minnesota limits the 
                                                
117 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
118 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 120, n.71-77.   
119 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2007) (applies only to incumbents); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5 
(2008) (applies to incumbents and candidates); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-305 (2007) (incumbents only); WISC. 
STAT. ANN. § 13.625 (West 2007) (incumbents and candidates).   
120 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-10-9 (2007).  
121 See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.170 (2007).  The Center for Public Integrity ranked Washington first in an 
analysis of state lobbying disclosure laws that promote openness, accountability and public access.  Center for 
Public Integrity, Hired Guns, Lobby Disclosure Ranking, May 15, 2003, available at 
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/nationwide.aspx. 
122 See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 15-714(d)(1)(i) (West 2007).  
123 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13C(b) (2007). 
124 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.13.072(a)(4), 15.13.074(g) (2008).  
125 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.226 (2007). 
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proportion of campaign contributions a candidate can receive from lobbyists, PACs, political 
funds, and large contributors.126 
In applying some of these state approaches to federal regulation of lobbying and 
campaign finance, three provisions appear the most appropriate.  First, the federal government 
should ban the practice of bundling contributions for delivery by lobbyists.  Doing so would 
work to sever the connection between large contributions and improved access to lawmakers 
receiving them.  Donors would still be able to make campaign contributions, but would have to 
face public scrutiny of their decisions and motivations in doing so.  Second, Minnesota’s 
proportional cap on contributions from what could be characterized as institutional donors should 
be implemented at the federal level.  This provision would allow well-funded groups to have 
their voices heard, but not at a volume that drowns out contributions from the average citizen-
donor.  It would encourage fundraisers to venture into the general public for campaign money, 
which would both pull more people into the political process and foster connections between 
candidates and the constituents they seek to represent in government.  Third, if bundled 
contributions are to remain as an element of campaign finance, they should be disclosed across 
the board without regard for whether the delivering agent is a lobbyist or PAC representative, 
and an exhaustive list of donors should be included in the report.  The disproportionate influence 
potentially accrued through the delivery of extraordinarily large donations warrants their 
disclosure generally.  If groups or individuals are capable of making or facilitating large 
contributions, and given that only individuals have the right to vote, no legitimate interest is 
served by permitting donors to hide behind bundled contributions.  As long as big donors are 
pursuing legitimate ends, what worries them about disclosure?   
                                                
126 See MINN. STAT. § 10A.27 (2007).  
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Adopting any of these state provisions at the federal level would make the legislative and 
political process more transparent and would improve the effectiveness of federal lobbying and 
campaign finance regulation.  Moreover, it would untie the merits of lobbying efforts from the 
ability to finance election campaigns and eliminate actual or perceived improper influence from 
the necessary involvement of experts in the legislative process.  
 
Part IV: Conclusion 
Lobbyists and other interest groups have a First Amendment right both to advocate their 
positions to government officials and to contribute financial support to any candidate they 
choose.  Under the distinct regulatory regimes governing them, lobbying and campaign finance, 
in isolation from one another, probably do not pose a significant danger to the administration of 
representative democracy.  However, given that the current regimes allow individuals, 
organizations, and interest groups to pair campaign finance with lobbying to advance their 
private goals to the detriment of the broader public interest, it is clear that today’s federal 
framework is inadequate.127  Potential sources of influence over public officials such as bundling 
campaign contributions can and should be regulated generally, not just when practiced by 
lobbyists.128  On the other hand, argues Professor Briffault, “there may be some situations where 
the campaign activities of lobbyists provide special influence for lobbyists above and beyond the 
benefits to their clients; in those cases, regulations aimed at lobbyists may be appropriate.”129  
The real question for today’s advocates of limited disclosure is, what do you want to hide, and 
why?  
 
                                                
127 See Briffault, supra note 1, at 121.  
128 Id. at 107.  
129 Id.   
